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Abstract—Crowdsourcing websites (e.g. Yahoo! Answers, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, and etc.) emerged in recent years that allow 
requesters from all around the world to post tasks and seek help 
from an equally global pool of workers. However, intrinsic 
incentive problems reside in crowdsourcing applications as workers 
and requester are selfish and aim to strategically maximize their 
own benefit. In this paper, we propose to provide incentives for 
workers to exert effort using a novel game-theoretic model based 
on repeated games. As there is always a gap in the social welfare 
between the non-cooperative equilibria emerging when workers 
pursue their self-interests and the desirable Pareto efficient 
outcome, we propose a novel class of incentive protocols based on 
social norms which integrates reputation mechanisms into the 
existing pricing schemes currently implemented on crowdsourcing 
websites, in order to improve the performance of the non-
cooperative equilibria emerging in such applications. We first 
formulate the exchanges on a crowdsourcing website as a two-sided 
market where requesters and workers are matched and play gift-
giving games repeatedly. Subsequently, we study the protocol 
designer’s problem of finding an optimal and sustainable 
(equilibrium) protocol which achieves the highest social welfare for 
that website. We prove that the proposed incentives protocol can 
make the website operate close to Pareto efficiency. Moreover, we 
also examine an alternative scenario, where the protocol designer 
aims at maximizing the revenue of the website and evaluate the 
performance of the optimal protocol. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Soliciting solutions to various tasks using online labor 
markets has become increasingly popular in recent years. The 
term “crowdsourcing”, a form of “peer production” that 
outsources works to a large group of people [1], was recently 
coined to refer to such approaches. Numerous crowdsourcing 
websites, such as Yelp [2], Yahoo! Answers [3] and Amazon 
Mechanical Turk [4], can be viewed as systems where small 
tasks (typically on the order of minutes or seconds) and 
performed in exchange for rewards awarded to the users who 
performed them. Examples of tasks found on crowdsourcing 
websites are the graphical design of logos, the creation of a 
marketing plan, the answering of a computer programming 
question, etc. For illustration purposes, we differentiate users on 
a crowdsourcing website by two different types. A user who 
posts tasks is called a “requester”, and a user who works on a 
posted task is called a “worker”. Many crowdsourcing websites 
exhibit similar structures – a task is described and posted by a 
requester together with the associated reward. Workers submit 
solutions to the task, and the requester selects a subset of 
submissions (usually the first one that solves the task) with the 
corresponding workers granted the reward [5]. 
Despite the success and the perceived promise of online labor 
markets, crowdsourcing websites face a serious practical 
challenge: providing appropriate incentives for workers to 
participate and well-perform in tasks. More concretely, a 
requester needs to establish sufficient rewards to attract workers’ 
contributions when workers do not solve tasks solely for altruistic 
motivations [5][6][10][11]. Such studies demonstrate that 
designing incentive mechanisms to encourage workers’ 
contributions is crucial to maintain the performance of 
crowdsourcing websites.  
Many of the incentive mechanisms on crowdsourcing 
websites rely on monetary rewards in the form of micro-
payments [5][7][8][9]. The requester pays workers in the form of 
cash upon the completion of a task. However, the monetary 
incentive mechanism possesses several disadvantages which 
prevent it from being easily deployed on crowdsourcing websites. 
The first problem associated with the payment system is the 
absence of associated effective pricing schemes. Due to the 
heterogeneity in tasks and requesters, the existing pricing scheme 
often provides competitive advantages to the requesters with high 
budgets [10]. Secondly, such pricing schemes often deploy 
auctions to set the price [7], which may result in high delay and 
implementation complexity in order to achieve desirable resource 
allocations and often cause “currency inflation” on the 
crowdsourcing websites. Moreover, it is also worth noting that to 
deploy such pricing schemes usually necessitates the usage of 
complicated and reliable financial accounting, which is difficult 
to design and deploy in large-scale online websites. Finally and 
most importantly, the current pricing schemes cannot solve the 
social dilemma existing between workers and requesters: if the 
payment of a task is ex-ante, which means that the requester pays 
before the task starts, a worker always has the incentive to take 
the payment and provides no effort to solve the task, a behavior 
commonly known as “Free-riding” [13]; whereas if the payment 
is ex-post, which means that the requester pays after the task is 
solved, he always has the incentive to refuse the payment to 
workers by lying about the outcome of this task, a behavior 
commonly known as “false-reporting” [13]. 
In this paper we address these challenges by designing a 
novel class of incentive protocols which rely on reputation 
mechanisms and only require a simple flat-rate pricing scheme. 
We assume that the payment is performed ex-ante on a 
crowdsourcing website, and focus mainly on the “free-riding” of 
workers. However, our protocol and system design can be 
straightforwardly extended to address the “false-reporting” 
problem of requesters.  
We assign each worker on a crowdsourcing website with a 
reputation which is gained based on its past behavior on the 
website. A differential reputation-based reward and punishment 
scheme is performed by some intermediary (e.g. the website 
administrator): a worker with a higher reputation will be given a 
higher chance to participate in tasks and receives more payments 
upon the completion of a task. Since a worker with a high 
reputation is treated preferentially, incentives to contribute are 
provided to workers in order to build up high reputations.  
Different from the traditional models in the design of pricing 
schemes where the interactions between workers and requesters 
are usually formalized as a one-shot game [7][8], we capture the 
repeated interactions between requesters and workers within the 
formalism of repeated games. To formalize the reputation 
scheme, social norms [15], which consist of a social strategy and 
a reputation scheme, are introduced to regulate the behavior of 
workers. By designing an appropriate social norm to punish 
workers’ deviations from the selected social strategy, we 
rigorously analyze how workers’ equilibrium behaviors will be 
influenced by the benefit and cost of tasks as well as their 
patience and show the tradeoff between the efficiency on the 
social welfare and the workers’ incentives. Subsequently, we 
quantify the sufficient and necessary conditions under which 
workers will find in their own self-interest to comply with the 
prescribed social strategy. We then define and solve the protocol 
design problem of selecting an optimal social norm that 
maximizes the social welfare of the website. Using this analysis, 
we also discuss how the protocol design should be adjusted in 
order to maximize the revenue of the website. In the numerical 
simulations, we also consider the requesters’ strategic behavior 
and investigate how the requesters’ incentives will influence the 
optimal protocol design and the resulting problem of designing 
the optimal pricing schemes. 
In summary, the novelty of our work lies in the following 
aspects: 
(1) We explicitly formalize the interactions between workers 
and requesters using a rigorous repeated game framework to 
analyze the time-dependency of their current and future behavior. 
(2) We propose a novel class of incentive protocols based on 
social norms, which is simple to design and flexible in 
implementation, in order to incentivize workers to participate and 
contribute. We prove that our protocol can prevent the “free-
riding” problem of workers and incentivize them to contribute 
their efforts. This paper, according to our knowledge, is the first 
work that integrates payment and reputation mechanisms in a 
rigorous manner to design protocols for crowdsourcing 
applications. 
(3) Different from most ad-hoc protocol designs for 
crowdsourcing applications that are empirical and rely on trial-
and-error approaches, we rigorously analyze the structure of 
equilbria, which is critical in understanding the relationships 
between our designed protocol, the intrinsic market 
characteristics (e.g. rewards, costs, workers’ patience), and the 
workers’ incentives on a crowdsourcing website.  
(4) Using simulations, we numerically analyze the incentive 
problem of false-reporting on requesters, which is also neglected 
in current protocol designs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, a rigorous analytical framework is proposed to 
analyze the crowdsourcing website. In Section III, we analyze the 
non-cooperative equilibria of this model and discuss how our 
protocol design influences workers’ incentives. Section IV 
investigates the revenue maximization problem. After showing 
the simulation results in Section V, we conclude the paper in 
Section VI. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Setup 
A crowdsourcing website usually covers a wide variety of 
tasks. For example, Yahoo! Answers has 25 categories ranging 
from “Computers & Internet” to “Travel” to “Family & 
Relationships” to “Health” [3]. In this work, we explicitly 
analyze the workers’ incentives in a particular type of tasks, 
where questions are homogeneous in terms of the expertise and 
efforts needed to solve them. It should be noted that our analysis 
does not lose any generality by imposing this assumption. Since 
the incentive protocols designed in this paper can be easily 
extended to the scenario with multiple types of tasks by 
designing reputation systems and mechanisms for each individual 
type, respectively. 
To model the large user population, we utilize the widely-
used continuum model. Meanwhile, we assume that there is a 
larger population of requesters than that of workers. For 
simplicity, we assume that workers are long-lived on the website.  
When a requester generates a task, it is posted on the website 
with the price paid for completing it to be specified. We assume 
that the pricing scheme is exogenously determined (e.g. by the 
website owner) [10]. Regarding the fact that we consider tasks to 
be homogeneous, a flat-rate pricing scheme is adopted here, i.e. a 
requester pays a fixed price p  for each task. Workers are 
randomly selected for the different posted tasks. The selection is 
uniformly random, such that all posted tasks have an equal 
probability to be chosen by a worker. However, the selection is 
only performed among the workers who have the necessary 
knowledge and expertise to solve the particular type of task. This 
assumption is not restrictive since our analysis shows that the 
designed protocol is able to automatically block workers who are 
not capable to solve this type of tasks out of the system. Hence, 
all workers are equally capable in solving tasks posted on this 
website. The website is modeled as a discrete-time system where 
time is divided into periods. By selecting the length of a period as 
the normal amount of time for a worker to solve a task, each 
worker can perform only one task in one period. The probability 
that more than one worker are devoting to the same task is small 
and assumed to be 0 in our analysis.  
B. Stage Game 
The interaction between a worker and a requester in a task, 
which is defined as a “transaction”, can be modeled as an 
asymmetric gift-giving game [14]. We assume that the payment 
of the requester is ex-ante, i.e. he has to submit the payment once 
the worker starts to working on this task 1. In Section V, we 
explicitly discuss the incentive of requesters when they can 
strategically choose to submit the payment or not in a transaction. 
The payment is shared by the worker and the website. 
Particularly, the worker receives pl  where 1l <  as its reward, 
and the website charges an amount ( )1 pl- , which can be 
regarded as the maintenance cost or the usage fee of the website. 
The payment sharing ratio l  is explicitly determined by the 
protocol designer.  
Because the worker receives the payment in advance, he can 
strategically choose his action, i.e. determine the level of effort 
devoted to this task. The worker’s action will not only impact his 
                                                          
1 This model is utilized in several crowdsourcing websites [1], where the 
payment of the requester is click-based, i.e. it has to pay for each click that 
workers submit to its post.  
own utility, but also that of the requester. For simplicity, we 
assume that a worker’s action a  is chosen from a binary set 
{ },= H L 2 , where H  stands for “High level of effort”, 
whereas L  stands for “Low level of effort”. The utility matrix of 
one transaction is illustrated in Table 1, which is specified as 
follows. 
Table 1. The utility matrix of one transaction 
 Worker 
 H   L  
Requester V p- , p cl -  p- , pl  
If a H= , the worker consumes a cost c  for solving this task. 
The task is then solved and the requester receives a benefit of V . 
As we assume that tasks are homogeneous and workers are 
identical in terms of expertise and knowledge, we consider that c  
and V  are constant for each task in our formal analysis. 
However, our proposed framework can be extended to take task-
dependent costs and benefits into consideration. We assume that 
V c>  such that the task-solving process is socially valuable. 
Upon its completion, the task is removed from the website. 
If a L= , the worker free-rides by taking the payment and 
consuming a low cost, which is approximated by 0 here, and the 
requester receives no benefit 3 . The task is not solved and 
remains open for future workers.  
The social welfare U  is proportional to the sum utility of all 
users (requesters and workers) in one period and it is optimized 
when all workers devote a high level of efforts into their tasks. 
Nevertheless, the dominant strategy for a worker is to play 
a L=  in order to maximize its utility myopically, which gives 
rise to an undesirable social welfare.   
C. Social norms 
To formalize the repeated interactions among workers and 
requesters, a general repeated game formulation is deployed. An 
incentive protocol based on the idea of social norm is designed 
to improve the inefficiency of the myopic equilibrium. The 
formal definition of a social norm can be found in [15]. In this 
paper, it defines the rules that the manager of the website, which 
is called “website administrator” here, uses to reward or punish 
workers in order to regulate their behavior. It should be noted 
that a website administrator only takes charge of implementing 
the protocol designed by the protocol designer. Whether these 
two roles are played by the same person on a website does not 
affect our analysis. We differentiate them only for the purpose of 
illustrations. 
Formally, a social norm k , which is design by the protocol 
designer, is composed of a social strategy s , a reputation 
scheme t , and a reputation set  . 
In the repeated game, each worker is tagged with a reputation 
q  representing its social status. q  is a natural number from the 
finite set { }0,1,2, ,Kk  , where Kk  represents the size of 
this set. A high reputation relates to a worker’s good social status, 
which reflects his good behavior on solving tasks in the past. The 
reputation of each worker is maintained by the administrator. It is 
updated depending on the report of the requester about the 
outcome of the transaction. The detailed scheme and process of 
reputation updating will be introduced later.  
s  is a reputation-based strategy, which is represented by a 
mapping: :s   , where   represents the worker’s 
                                                          
2 Our framework can also be applied to the case when a  has multiple levels 
without changing the analysis. 
3 This models the scenario when the requester receives a low benefit and the 
worker submits a low effort. We take the extreme value of 0 only for the 
simplicity for the analysis. 
reputation, and   represents the approved action of the worker 
at a particular reputation. 
t  serves as the reward and punishment system in the social 
norm, and it specifies how a worker’s reputation should be 
updated based on its actions in the transactions that it is engaged. 
In our framework, t  updates a worker’s reputation at the end of 
each transaction. Specifically, t  is represented by a mapping 
:t ´   , where   is the worker’s reported action in a 
transaction. If the requester thinks that the task is solved, the 
worker is rewarded with his reputation increased; on the other 
hand, if the task is not solved, the worker is punished and his 
reputation decreases. Since a requester cannot benefit by falsely 
reporting the outcome as the payment is ex-ante, he is always 
truth-telling. However, there would be some discrepancy 
between the worker’s devoted effort level and the requester’s 
perception on the outcome. Specifically, the requester might be 
unsatisfied with the outcome and report the task as unsolved even 
if the worker has devoted a high level of effort; whereas the 
requester might regard the task as being solved when the worker 
devoted few effort and played a L= . Such scenarios are 
assumed to happen in a transaction with a small probability 
1a  . 
To encourage the workers to contribute and mitigate free-
riding, we restrict our attention to a simple class of threshold-
based social strategies G . A worker will be isolated by the 
administrator and is forbidden to interact with requesters and 
participate in any task if his reputation is low. In this case, the 
social norm does not require the worker to do anything. On the 
contrary, the administrator “activates” the worker by allowing 
him to participate in tasks if his reputation is high, and the social 
norm require the worker to devote a high level of efforts in his 
transactions. Every social strategy s Î G  can be characterized 
by a service thresholds ( ) { }1, ,h Kks Î   4 and is specified as 
follows: 
 ( ) ( )( )
        
         
H if h
L if h
q ss q q s
ìï ³ï= íï <ïïî
. (1) 
Let hk  denote the threshold of the selected social strategy 
and is called as the social threshold, the reputation scheme we 
adopted here is as follows: 
 ( )
{ }min , 1      
1                1
,
0                    
+1               
K if a H and h
if a L and h
a
if a L and h
if h
k k
k
k
k
q q
q qt q q
q q
ìï + = ³ïïï - = ³ +ïï= íï = =ïïï <ïïî
. (2) 
 
Under this reputation scheme, when a worker is active (i.e 
hkq ³ ), his reputation increases by 1 while not exceeding Kk  
after one period, if his requester reports the task as being solved. 
Once the task is being reported as unsolved, the worker’s 
reputation drops by 1 as a warning from the administrator. When 
the worker’s reputation falls to hk  and he receives another 
negative feedback from his requester, he is isolated with his 
reputation falling to 0. During the window of isolation, the 
worker’s reputation goes back by one point in each period until 
reaching hk  when he is activated again. Hence, this reputation 
                                                          
4 It should be noted here when the threshold is lower than 1 or higher than 
1Kk + , all workers are treated equally and the free-riding problem cannot be 
solved in this case.  
scheme brings up the punishment to workers with an isolation of 
hk  periods. For illustration purposes, we call a worker who 
complies with the social norm as a “compliant worker” and a 
worker who deviates from the social norm as a “non-compliant 
worker”. 
We make several remarks here: 
(1)  The design purpose of the social norm is to enforce a 
worker to play with the social strategy s , in which a H=  is 
played whenever he is active. 
(2) If there is a worker who does not have the necessary 
expertise to solve the tasks. He will be isolated for most of the 
time and will not affect the social welfare. 
(3) If there are multiple sections or discussion boards on a 
website focusing on different types of tasks. The above incentive 
scheme can be simply extended by designing one separate set of 
reputation and a related reputation scheme for each type, 
respectively. In this case, a worker maintains a vector of 
reputations, where each element reflects his social status in the 
section of a particular type. 
A schematic representation of a social norm is provided in 
Figure 1 with the upper one illustrating the decision process of a 
social strategy, and the lower one illustrating the decision process 
of a reputation scheme. 
It is worth noting that an isolated worker’s reputation 
transition across periods is not affected by the error probability 
a  since he is not engaged in any transaction. On the contrary, 
an active worker’s reputation has a positive probability of not 
being corrected updated. A worker’s reputation transition 
probability across periods will be explicitly calculated in the 
next section. 
D. Utilities 
In this section, we discuss the utility of compliant workers. 
An isolated worker receives a utility of 0 in one period and an 
active worker receives p cl - , i.e.  
 ( ) ,     
0,             
p c if h
v
if h
k
k
k
l qq q
ìï - ³ï= íï <ïïî
. (3) 
Obviously, we need c
p
l ³  to provide workers with correct 
incentives, which is assumed throughout the paper. We use the 
infinite-horizon discounted sum criterion to evaluate a worker’s 
expected long-term utility as the sum of his one-period utility in 
the current period and his discounted expected future utility 
starting from the next period. Let ( )' |pk q q  denote the transition 
probability of a compliant worker’s reputation across periods 
under the social norm k , it can be determined as follows 
 ( )
{ }'
'
' '
'
1 ,    min , 1
,    1
| ,    0
1,    1
0,  
h and K
h and
p h and
h and
otherwise
k k
k
k k
k
a q q q
a q q q
q q a q q
q q q
ìï - ³ = +ïïïï ³ = -ïïïï= = =íïïï < = +ïïïïïïî
.(4) 
Therefore, a compliant worker’s expected long-term utility in the 
repeated game starting from any period 0t , can be expressed as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0
0
0 0
'
' '           |
t tt
t t
t t
v v
v p v
k k
k k k
q
q d q
q d q q q
¥¥
=
¥
æ ö÷çæ ö æ ö÷ç÷ ÷ç ç ÷= ç÷ ÷ç ç ÷÷ ÷ç ççè ø è ø÷ç ÷è ø
æ ö æ ö÷ ÷ç ç= +÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç çè ø è ø
å
å

. (5) 
where )0,1d éÎ êë  is the discount factor describing a worker’s 
patience, which represents the weight that a worker gives to his 
utility that can be received in the future. Since all workers are 
long-lived on the website, we assume that they all have the same 
discount factor. 
The social welfare of the website depends on the reputation 
distribution of the workers’ population. The reputation 
distribution in one period is denoted by ( ){ }
0
L
qh q ==h , with 
each term ( )h q  representing the fraction of workers in the 
workers’ population holding a reputation q . Due to the 
reputation update (performed by the administrator at the end of 
each period), h  evolves dynamically over time. Since we are 
interested in the long-term utilities of workers, we study the 
stationary distribution kh  in the long run when all workers 
complying with the social norm, which is defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 ,  1 1 
1 1
1 ,  1 1
0
K K K
h K
h h
h
h
k k k k k
k k k k k
k k k k k
k k k
k k k
h a h a h
h q a h q ah q q
h h ah q
h q h q q
h ah
= - + - -
= - - + + + £ £ -
= - + +
= - £ £ -
=
.
 (6) 
 
Therefore, the social welfare of the website is defined as the 
expected one-period utility averaged over all workers and all 
hkq <
a H=
hkq ³
a L=   
 
0
hk
L
1hk -
1hk +
a L=
a H= a L=
 
Figure 1   The schematic representation of a social norm 
requesters who are engaged in transactions when the reputation 
distribution is stationary 5 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
h h
U v v V p
k k
k k k k k
q q
h q q h q q
< ³
= + + -å å . (7) 
III. OPTIMAL DESIGN OF SOCIAL NORM BASED PROTOCOLS 
A. Defining sustainable protocols  
Workers are rational and self-interested, they will comply 
with the prescribed social norm if and only if it is in their self-
interests to do so, i.e. they cannot benefit in terms of their long-
term utility upon deviations. Hence, the incentive of active 
workers has to be investigated when designing the protocol, in 
order to determine when compliance is individually optimal to all 
of them 6.  
Because a worker’s long-term utility possesses a recursive 
structure according to (5), individual optimality can be 
determined by the one-shot deviation principle [12]: if a worker 
cannot benefit upon a single deviation from the social strategy, 
i.e. he deviates in one period but complies with the social strategy 
subsequently, he also cannot gain by deviating to any strategy 
other than s . On the basis of the one-shot deviation principle, 
we define the social norm equilibrium as follows: 
Definition 1 {Social Norm Equilibrium}. A social norm 
( ),k s t=  is in equilibrium if and only if  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
'
| | ,c p v p a vk k k
qq
d q q q q q q¥ ¥
¢
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ¢ ¢¢ ¢ ¢£ - ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè øå å . (8) 
where ( )| ,p aq q¢  represents a worker’s reputation transition 
probability under k  when he chooses an action a . Clearly, we 
have ( ) ( )( )| | ,p pk q q q q s q¢ ¢=  for all q  and q ¢ . 
A protocol consists a social norm k  and a payment sharing 
ratio l , the sustainability of a protocol is correspondingly 
defined as follows. 
Definition 2 {Sustainable Protocol}. A protocol ( ),k l  is 
sustainable if and only if k  is a social norm equilibrium.  
The equilibrium condition (8) is analyzed in details below. 
For a compliant worker of reputation 1hkq ³ + , he plays 
a H=  and consumes a cost c . His reputation increases to 
{ }min , 1K q +  with the probability 1 a-  and decreases to 
1q-  the probability a . Hence his long-term utility is 
( ) ( ) { }( ) ( )1 min , 1 1V H p c v K vq k kl d a q a q¥ ¥é ù= - + - + + -ê úë û . 
On the contrary, if the worker submits a one-period deviation and 
plays a L= , he saves the immediate cost c , while  the 
probabilities of his reputation to increase and decrease become 
a  and 1 a- , respectively. The long-term utility then becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) { }( )1 1 min , 1V L p v v Kq k kl d a q a q¥ ¥é ù= + - - + +ê úë û . 
According to (8), the worker has no incentive to deviate if and 
only if ( ) ( )V H V Lq q³ . 
                                                          
5 Since requesters whose tasks are not being solved can be regarded as being 
engaged in transactions with isolated workers with a zero utility in this period, 
our formulation does not lose any generality. 
6 It should be noted here that the incentive for isolated workers do not need to 
be considered since they do not participate in any task and will comply with the 
social norm by default. 
By applying similar analysis to workers of reputation hk , we 
derive the following condition for a social norm to be in 
equilibrium: 
 
( ) { }( ) ( )
( ) { }( ) ( )
0 1 2 min , 1 1 ,  if 1,
0 1 2 min , 1 0 ,  if .
v K v c h
v K h v c h
k k k k
k k k k k
d a q q q
d a q
¥ ¥
¥ ¥
é ù£ - + - - - ³ +ê úë ûé ù£ - + - - =ê úë û
. (9) 
In our subsequent analysis, we refer to the RHS of (9) as 
workers’ incentives. A positive incentive guarantees a worker’s 
compliance to the social norm, and a protocol is sustainable if 
and only if workers have positive incentives at any hkq ³ . 
B. Problem formulation 
In this section, we discuss the design of a sustainable 
protocol that maximizes the social welfare of the website. Based 
on the above analysis, the protocol design can be simplified to 
the selection on three parameters: the size Kk  of the reputation 
set, the social threshold hk , and the payment sharing ratio l . 
This is formalized in (10) (we call this problem “social welfare 
optimization”). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the optimal 
social welfare also depends on the parameters c , p , d , and a , 
which are assumed to be fixed and cannot be designed by the 
protocol designer. In the remainder of this paper, these 
parameters are referred as intrinsic parameters of the website.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) { }( ) ( )
( ) { }( ) ( )
, ,
max   
subject to  
 1 2 min , 1 1 ,  if 1,
 1 2 min , 1 0 ,  if .
K h h h
U v v V p
c v L v h
c v L v h
k k k k
k k k k kl q q
k k k
k k k
h q q h q q
d a q q q
d a q q
< ³
¥ ¥
¥ ¥
= + + -
é ù£ - + - - ³ +ê úë ûé ù£ - + - =ê úë û
å å
.
 (10) 
In (10), we explicitly focus on sustainable protocols without 
considering all possible protocols in the design space. To justify 
such restriction, we first prove in the following theorem that the 
social welfare that can be achieved by a social norm that is not 
in equilibrium is always smaller than the optimal value of (10) 
and hence, it is only necessary to consider sustainable protocols 
in order to maximize the social welfare. The detailed proof is 
deterred to [16]. 
Theorem 1. Any social norm that does not satisfy (9) 
delivers a social welfare that is smaller than the optimal value of 
(10).  
Proof: See [16, Appendix A]. ■ 
C. The design of optimal sustainable protocols 
The social welfare optimization requires the joint 
consideration on how a protocol impacts the social welfare and 
the workers’ incentives of compliance. In this section, we 
separately analyse the impacts of three design parameters 
( ), ,K hk k l  in order to characterize the optimal design, which is 
denoted as ( )* * *, ,K h l .  
We first analyse the payment sharing ratio l . Since an 
increasing l  only reduces the revenue of the website without 
hurting workers’ utilities, it is easy to see that given any social 
norm k , the social welfare and the workers’ incentives are both 
maximized when 1l = .  
Proposition 1. Given a social norm k , * 1l =  is always the 
optimal solution of (10).  
Proof: See [16, Appendix A]. ■ 
In the remainder of our design, we set 1l =  by default 
without further notice. 
Next, we focus on the design of the social norm. We first 
analyze the relationship between the social welfare Uk  and 
( ),K hk k  by assuming workers’ compliance, i.e. the incentive 
constraints (9) are not explicitly considered.  
Given hk , the fraction of isolated workers in the workers’ 
population decreases with an increasing Kk . Hence, Uk  will 
increase with more workers’ participations. On the other hand, 
given Kk , a larger hk  implies a larger window of isolation and 
thus more severe punishment on workers, which reduces the 
workers’ participation ratio in tasks and thus Uk . Therefore, 
without incentive constraints (9), it is always optimal to select 
1hk =  and the largest Kk  that is allowed by the website in 
order to maximize the social welfare. The design problem now is 
transformed into the selection for the smallest hk  and the largest 
Kk  with which the incentive constraints (9) are satisfied. These 
observations are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Uk  monotonically increases with Kk  and 
monotonically decreases with hk .  
Proof: See [16, Appendix A]. ■ 
The analysis on the relationship between the workers’ 
incentives and ( ),K hk k  is more complicated, since we need to 
consider the time dependency between workers’ current and 
future utilities. To facilitate the analysis, we define the marginal 
utilities of workers as  
 ( ) { }( ) ( )min , 1 ,  v v K vk k k kq q q q¥ ¥ ¥D + - " Î  , (11) 
which transforms the incentive constraints (9) as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0 1 2 1 1 ,  if 1,
0 1 2 ,  if .
h
v v c h
v c h
k
k k k
k k
q
d a q q q
d a q q
¥ ¥
¥
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é ù£ - D - +D + - ³ +ê úë û
£ - D - =å


.
 (12) 
The following proposition characterizes the structure of the 
marginal utilities.  
Proposition 3. The marginal utilities defined in (11) 
preserves the following properties: 
(1) ( ) 0vk q¥D > , q" Î ; 
(2) ( ) ( )1v vk kq q¥ ¥D > D + , { }, , 1h Kk kq" Î - ;  
(3) ( ) ( )1
0
h
v v h
k
k k k
q
q
-
¥ ¥
=
D > Då

 . ■ 
The impact of Proposition 3 is briefly explained below. 
Statement (1) proves that a worker’s long-term utility increases 
with his reputation. In this way, a social norm is capable of 
providing incentives to workers with positive rewards associated 
with their compliance (although the incentive might not be 
sufficiently large depending on the cost c ). Statement (2) shows 
that the increase on the long-term utility slows down as a 
worker’s reputation increases. Therefore, a worker with a higher 
reputation is less rewarded by complying with the social norm 
and thus, he has less incentive to do so. Statement (3) proves 
that a worker of reputation hk  has the highest incentive, which 
is ( ) ( )
0
1 2
h
v c
k
k
q
d a q¥
=
- D -å

 , among all active workers. 
Combining Statement (2) and (3), we can conclude that it is the 
incentive of workers of reputation Kk , which is the smallest 
among all active workers, that determines the sustainability of a 
protocol.   
By applying Proposition 3, we have the following theorem 
establishing a protocol’s sustainability conditions on ( ),h Kk k  
(i.e. how these parameters should be selected by the protocol 
designer in order to sustain the resulting social norm as an 
equilibrium). 
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium Conditions of Social Norms). 
Given p , c , d , and a , a social ( ),k s t=  can be sustained as 
an equilibrium if and only if 
(1) Its social threshold hk  is larger than a constant 
( ), , ,h p c d a ; 
(2) The highest reputation Kk  is smaller than a constant 
( ), , ,K p c d a .  
Proof: See [16, Appendix A]. ■ 
Theorem 2 provides a guideline for selecting the parameters 
( ),h Kk k  of a sustainable protocol. As the proof shows, 
increasing the social threshold hk  enlarges the gap between the 
long-term utilities that can be received by active and isolated 
workers. This provides a larger threat of future punishment for 
active workers and hence reduces their incentives of deviation. 
On the other hand, increasing Kk  extends the length of the 
warning window. Since more deviations are needed to trigger 
the punishment upon workers, their incentives of compliance 
decrease as a result. 
Theorem 2, however, does not explicitly consider the 
intrinsic constraints imposed on ( ),h Kk k . Specifically, if 
( ) ( ), , , , , ,h p c K p cd a d a>  or ( ), , , 1K p c d a < , there will be 
no protocol that can be sustained in workers’ self-interests. The 
existence of sustainable protocol in general is impacted jointly 
by the intrinsic parameters c , p , d , and a  (since we set 
1l = ). In the following theorem, we establish sufficient and 
necessary conditions on these parameters for the existence of 
sustainable protocols. 
Theorem 3 (Existence of Sustainable Protocols). 
Sustainable protocols exist if and only if 
(1) Given d  and a , the cost-to-price ratio cr
p
  of the 
worker is lower than a threshold ( ),r d a ; 
(2) Given the cost-to-price ratio r  and a , the discount 
factor d  is higher than a threshold ( ),rd a ; 
(3) Given r  and d , the error probability a  is lower than a 
threshold ( ),ra d  and higher than a threshold ( ),ra d .  
Proof: See [16, Appendix A]. ■ 
It should be noted from Theorem 3 that it is neither p  nor c  
but the ratio between them that determines the existence of 
sustainable protocols. Moreover, sustainable protocols exist if 
and only if a worker is sufficiently patient (i.e. he puts 
sufficiently large weight in his future utility rather than saving 
the immediate cost) and the transaction error probability is 
sufficiently small (i.e. workers can be correctly rewarded and 
punished with truthful reports from requesters). However, when 
a  approaches 0, ( )v Kk k¥D  also approaches 0 and hence 
workers of reputation of reputation Kk  cannot be incentivized 
to comply with the social norm. Therefore, a  is also lower-
bounded to ensure the existence of sustainable protocols. 
As a corollary of Theorem 3, it can be shown that sustainable 
protocols always exist in an idealized scenario, with 0r   and 
1d  . 
Corollary 1. There is always at least one sustainable 
protocol if 0r  , and 1d  .  
Proof: See [16, Appendix A]. ■ 
Based on Theorem 2 and 3, an algorithm to design the 
optimal sustainable protocol can be proposed, which is greatly 
simplified by applying the threshold-based properties of 
parameters. The detailed design of the algorithm is deferred to 
[16].   
IV. PROTOCOL DESIGN FOR REVENUE MAXIMIZATION 
In this section, we consider a different protocol design 
problem when the protocol designer wants to maximize the 
revenue of the website from all transactions.  
The revenue that the website receives from each transaction is 
( )1 pl- . It is always to the best interest of the protocol designer 
to set l  as small as possible to unilaterally increase the revenue. 
However, as shown in Proposition 1, a small l  reduces the 
benefit of a worker, which in turn harms the worker’s incentive 
to comply with the social norm. With more workers being 
isolated, the number of on-going transactions in each period 
decreases and the total revenue of the website might also 
decrease. 
Hence, the protocol designer also has to find the balance 
between the revenue received by the website per transaction and 
workers’ incentives of contribution in the revenue maximization 
problem. It is worth noting that different from the social welfare 
maximization where the protocol should maximize workers’ 
contributions in transactions, the revenue maximization only 
have to minimize the fraction of workers being isolated. This is 
due to the fact that the website can receive its part of the payment 
as long as a transaction is initiated (i.e. a worker and a requester 
is matched), regardless of whether the worker contributes efforts 
or not afterwards. Hence, the revenue in principle does not 
necessarily achieve its optimum under a sustainable protocol. 
However, it will be shown in our simulation that the maximum 
revenue that can be achieved with sustainable protocols is usually 
higher than that can be achieved with unsustainable protocols, 
except in some extreme scenarios. In other words, the optimal 
revenue of the website is generally achieved with a sustainable 
protocol in most cases. Therefore, we focus on the revenue 
maximization among sustainable protocols in this section, which 
is formalized as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) { }( ) ( )
( ) { }( ) ( )
, ,
max   1
subject to  
 1 2 min , 1 1 ,  if 1,
 1 2 min , 1 0 ,  if .
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k k k
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 (13) 
The parameters
 ( ),h Kk k  have a similar impact on the 
protocol design as in Section III. Particularly, an increasing hk  
also reduces Rk ; whereas an increasing Kk  also increases Rk . 
Nevertheless, l  plays a different role here. An increasing l  
increases workers’ incentives but reduces the owner’s revenue. 
As a result, the optimal design #l  for (13) is the minimum value 
of l  that satisfies the incentive constraints (9). In the follow 
proposition, we characterize how #l  is influenced by the 
intrinsic parameters. 
Proposition 4. (1) #l  monotonically increases with the cost-
to-price ratio r  and monotonically decreases with the discount 
factor d ;  
(2) #
0
lim 0
r
l

= , and #
1
lim r
d
l

= .  
Proof: See [16, Appendix B]. ■ 
As an immediate result of Proposition 4, we prove in the 
following proposition that the optimal revenue of (13), denoted 
as #R , possesses similar monotonicity results against r  and d . 
Proposition 5. #R  monotonically decreases with the cost-
to-price ratio r  and monotonically increases with the discount 
factor d .  
Proof: See [16, Appendix B]. ■ 
Proposition 4 and 5 indicate that with the increase on r  and 
the decrease on d , the workers’ incentives monotonically 
decrease and hence, l  needs be increased by the protocol 
designer to raise the benefit per transaction of workers at the 
expense of the revenue of the website.   
V. ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS 
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate the 
features of our proposed protocol design for crowdsourcing 
websites. A fixed price 5p =  is utilized, and the cost c  
depends on the type of tasks but is restricted to be smaller than 
p . 
A. Experiments on social welfare optimization 
We first analyze the problem (10) of social welfare 
optimization. Figure 2 illustrates how the optimal design 
( )* *,K h  is influenced by the intrinsic parameters. For 
illustration purposes, we set * 0K =  and * 0h =  when there is 
no sustainable protocol. 
When the cost and thus the cost-to-price ratio r  increases, 
the workers’ incentives decrease. As workers of reputation Kk  
has the lowest incentive of comply with the social norm, which 
serves as the bottleneck in the optimal design, *K  monotonically 
decreases with r  as well.  
*h  increases at first to provide higher incentives for workers 
as r increases. However, when r  is sufficiently large, *h  starts 
to decrease due to the intrinsic constraint * *h K£ . When r  
approaches 1, there is no social norm that can be sustained as an 
equilibrium and hence both *K  and *h  fall to 0. A similar 
phenomenon is also observed when the discount factor d  of 
workers increases from 0 to 1. As workers have more patience, it 
becomes easier to sustain a protocol where both *K  and the gap 
* *K h-  increase, thereby leading to an increased optimal social 
welfare. It also can be observed that *K  is always higher and *h  
is always lower with a smaller transaction error probability a , as 
workers have higher incentives then.  
The resulting social welfare according to the optimal design 
in Figure 2 is plotted in Figure 3, where we set 10V =  and 
normalized the social welfare with its Pareto efficient outcome 
V c- , i.e. the highest social welfare that can be possibly 
achieved on the website. As the results show, the optimal 
protocol design leads to a high social welfare which is close to 
the Pareto efficient outcome when the error probability is small 
and workers are sufficiently patient. 
B. Experiments on revenue maximization 
In this section, we analyze the problem (13) of revenue 
maximization. It should be noted that (13) only optimally 
determines the payment sharing ratio under the condition that the 
resulting protocol is sustainable, i.e. workers can comply with the 
social norm with their self-interests. In this experiment, we 
explicitly consider the revenue maximization problem among 
protocols that cannot be sustained and the related maximum 
revenue is denoted as #NSR  in order to differentiate with 
#R . 
Figure 4 (a) plots #l  that is the optimal solution of (13). With r  
increasing, workers have less incentives to comply with the 
social norm and hence, the website has to share more revenues 
with workers to incentivize their contributions and #l  
monotonically increases. It is also worth noting that #l  is 
always larger than r . Otherwise, the utility that a worker 
receives from one transaction, which is #p cl - , will be smaller 
than 0 and they cannot be incentivized regardless of the design of 
social norms. When 0r  , the cost related to the high effort 
level of a worker is small and the website can charge more in a 
transaction with #l  approaching 0. Figure 4 (b) plots the 
resulting #R  as well as #NSR . Similar to Figure 3, we also 
normalize the revenues using the highest revenue that can 
possibly be earned by the website, which is p . With #l  
increasing against r , #R  decreases since (1) the fraction of 
active workers reduces and thus fewer transactions take place in 
one period and (2) the website owner’s revenue share in one 
transaction decreases. # #NSR R<  occurs only when r  
approaches 1. At this region, #R  falls to 0 since no sustainable 
protocol exists then. Thereby, we show that, with the exception 
of the scenario in which the cost-to-price ratio is extremely large, 
#R  is the optimal revenue that can be earned by the website 
among all protocols. 
C. Experiments with strategic requesters 
So far, we consider a fixed pricing scheme and do not 
explicitly consider the strategic behavior of requesters. In 
practice, requesters are also rational and self-interested who try to 
maximize their individual utilities. If the price set for a task is too 
high, their incentives to submit the payment and participate in the 
crowdsourcing website will be mitigated.  
In this section, we assume that requesters are also strategic 
and have the freedom in determining whether to pay or not. The 
utility matrix of a transaction can thus be specified as follows 
where both workers and requesters are strategic (here we assume 
1l = ): 
 
Table 2. The utility matrix with strategic requesters 
  Worker 
  H  L
Requester Pay 
V p- , p c-  p- , p
No pay V , c-  0 , 0
 
It is obvious that the dominant action for the requester is “No 
pay” and hence, an incentive mechanism is also needed to 
encourage requesters’ payments. As discussed in Section II, we 
also establish a reputation system for requesters as well as the 
corresponding social norm based incentive protocol. The same 
forms of the social strategy and the reputation scheme as in (1) 
and (2) are applied. This is, a requester’s reputation increases if 
he pays a worker the agreed price for a task, and otherwise his 
reputation will decrease. Once a requester’s reputation falls to a 
threshold value reqh , one further deviation will trigger an 
isolation on him for reqh  periods, during which this requester is 
forbidden to post tasks. Consequently, a requester has to trade-off 
his immediate cost, which is p , with his future utility, which is 
proportional to V , in order to maximize his long-term utility. 
In the experiment, 800 requesters and 200 workers are 
deployed. We assume that each worker can solve one task per 
period. Therefore, a requester engages in one transaction every 
four periods on average. The pricing scheme is still flat-rate, and 
we examine how the price p  influences the social welfare, when 
the social norms for both workers and requesters are optimally 
designed. The discount factor d  is 0.8 for workers and 0.5 for 
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requesters, regarding the fact that requesters usually stay on the 
website for a shorter period of time. Figure 5 plots the results 
where the social welfare is normalized with the Pareto efficient 
outcome V c- . With the price p  increasing, workers are 
incentivized to contribute since they receive a higher benefit from 
each transaction. However, when p  is too large, requesters lose 
their incentives to participate because their cost incurred in each 
transaction is too high. With the requesters stopping to post tasks, 
the social welfare decreases. When 10p = , which is equal to V , 
few requester will post tasks and the social welfare approaches 0.  
Next, we analyze the design of the optimal price *p  which 
maximizes the social welfare. Figure 6 illustrates how *p  
changes against the ratio /c V . With the increase of the cost c , 
more incentives need to be provided to workers and hence, *p  
monotonically increases.  
We also compare *p  under different values of a  and the 
ratio between the populations of requesters and workers, which is 
denoted as T . A larger a  results in lower incentives for workers, 
which in turn requires a higher price *p  to encourage their 
contributions. On the contrary, when T  becomes larger, 
requesters have a lower frequency to interact with workers. 
Therefore, they will put less weight on their future utilities. As a 
result, *p  should be set smaller in order to reduce requesters’ 
immediate cost to encourage their participations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we build a generic framework to analyze and 
design incentive protocols based on social norms for 
crowdsourcing websites. We designed optimal protocols which 
are sustainable and hence, in which no workers gain by deviating 
from the social strategy prescribed by the protocol. The structure 
of optimal protocols maximizing the social welfare is 
investigated, and we rigorously analyzed the relationships 
between our designed protocol, the intrinsic parameters (e.g. 
rewards, costs, workers’ patience), and the workers’ incentives 
on a crowdsourcing website. A simple protocol design algorithm 
is proposed and we proved that our protocol can successfully 
prevent the “free-riding” problem of workers and incentivize 
them to contribute their efforts in the task-solving processes. We 
also explicitly consider the revenue maximization problem of the 
website owner, and discussed its difference to the problem of the 
social welfare optimization. Our simulation results illustrate the 
impacts of the intrinsic parameters and worker’ characteristics on 
the performance of incentive protocols and verify that our social 
norm based protocol can deliver a good performance which is 
close to the Pareto efficient outcome. Finally, we considered the 
incentive problems of requesters and analyze the impact of the 
pricing scheme on the performance of the crowdsourcing website. 
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Figure 6   Optimal price *p  
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